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Faith in Humanity1 
I 
Many of the people we regard as moral exemplars have profound 
faith in people’s decency: When segregationists bombed a black 
church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four little girls, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. insisted that “somehow we must believe that the 
most misguided among them can learn to respect the dignity and 
worth of all human personality”.2 Returning to his work in psycho-
therapy after spending two and a half years in Nazi concentration 
camps, Viktor Frankl adopted as a guiding principle the view that 
“if we treat people as if they were what they ought to be, we help 
them become what they are capable of becoming”.3 During his 
campaign to secure civil rights for Indians living in South Africa, 
and later to secure independence for India, Gandhi urged his fol-
lowers to treat as “an article of faith” the view that there is “no one 
so fallen” that he cannot be “converted by love”.4  
That these and other moral exemplars have such faith is no acci-
dent. As I will argue, having a certain form of faith in people’s de-
cency, which I call faith in humanity, is a centrally important mor-
al virtue. But despite the fact that history and literature provide 
striking examples of people who are admirable partly because they 
have such faith, moral philosophers have largely ignored this 
                                                          
1 The final publication is available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12024/abstract. 
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12024   
2 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Eulogy for Martyred Children”, in A Testa-
ment of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., ed. James M. Washington (New York: HarperCollins, 1986), p. 
222.    
3 Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, Third ed., trans. Richard and 
Clara Winston (New York: Random House, Inc., 1986), p. 8. Frankl at-
tributes this principle to Goethe.       
4 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (New 





trait.5 And I suspect that if they were to consider such faith, many 
philosophers would view it with suspicion. For some, the phrase 
“faith in humanity” conjures images of someone who is simply na-
ïve, and as a result, vulnerable to being exploited, or worse, likely 
to bring it about that other people are harmed. More generally, 
philosophers prize rationality, and rightly so, and they may dis-
miss faith in humanity – or for that matter, any sort of faith – as 
an objectionable form of epistemic irrationality, whether or not 
practical considerations commend it.6   
But I will argue that such suspicion is misplaced, and that having 
some measure of faith in humanity is central to moral life. In Sec-
tion II, I will explain what it means to have faith in humanity, and 
in Sections III and IV, I will present two sorts of arguments for the 
view that having such faith is a moral virtue. First, I will discuss 
two exemplars of this virtue, one historical and the other literary. 
                                                          
5 Some philosophers commend traits that are similar to the faith I have in 
mind, but also, as I will explain below, importantly distinct from it. Rous-
seau, Kant, and Rawls each possessed and endorsed a kind of faith in the 
possibility of people’s living together in peace, provided that the right 
sorts of social conditions obtain. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract (1762); Immanuel Kant, “To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch” (1795); and John Rawls, “The Law of People’s”, in The Law of 
Peoples: with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 1-128. Julia Driver claims that a vir-
tuous person exhibits “blind charity”, a disposition to see the good in 
people, but not the bad (“The Virtues of Ignorance”, The Journal of Phi-
losophy 86 [1989]: 381 and 382).     
6 Susan Wolf expresses a different kind of skepticism about such traits. 
She claims that a moral saint, someone who is “as morally worthy as can 
be”, will “look for the best in people” and “give them the benefit of the 
doubt as long as possible” (“Moral Saints”, The Journal of Philosophy 79 
[1982]: 419-422). But she argues that such traits prevent the saint from 
having or appreciating certain goods that are worth having or appreciat-
ing. So, although having faith in people’s decency is part of living a mor-
ally admirable life, this trait, together with others that a moral saint pos-
sesses, may prevent one from living certain other kinds of lives that are 
admirable, all things considered. Since my aim is only to show that hav-






By describing people whose lives vividly exhibit faith in humanity, 
I aim to make more plausible the intuition that such faith is moral-
ly admirable, and to show that certain grounds for skepticism 
about such faith are inapt. Of course, not everyone will share my 
intuitions. So I will also provide a rationale for the view that hav-
ing faith in humanity is a moral virtue. Roughly, I will argue that 
such faith is morally significant because having faith in people’s 
decency tends to prompt them to act rightly, helps one avoid treat-
ing them unjustly, and constitutes a morally important form of 
support for them.    
II 
Faith in humanity has both a cognitive and a volitional element, 
and I will begin by providing a rough characterization of each.7 
Turning first to the cognitive element, when someone who has 
faith in humanity morally evaluates other people’s actions, mo-
tives, or characters, she tends to give them the benefit of the 
doubt. She has a kind of optimism about people, generally laying 
the burden of proof with those who believe that people are base or 
expect people to act wrongly. This optimism is not merely a vague 
sense that “people are generally pretty good”, which has little bear-
ing on her treatment of particular people, nor is it a tendency to 
judge that, generally speaking, humans are capable of living to-
gether in peace, given favorable social conditions. Rather, it is an 
attitude, or stance, that she adopts toward the particular people 
                                                          
7 I borrow these labels from Robert Adams, who argues that it is morally 
important that we have “moral faith” – roughly, faith that achieving cer-
tain morally important aims is both possible and worthwhile – and that 
such faith has cognitive, volitional, and emotional elements (“Moral 
Faith”, in Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999], pp. 373-389). Though I do not claim that 
an emotional element is essential to faith in humanity, my characteriza-
tion of faith in humanity is indebted to Adams’ discussion of moral faith. 
Also, my characterization of the cognitive element of faith in humanity is 
indebted to Simon Keller and Sarah Stroud’s accounts of a form of faith 
that good friends have in one another. See Keller’s “Friendship and Be-
lief”, in The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 24-51 and Stroud’s “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship”, Ethics 





she encounters, or whose circumstances she considers, and it 
helps determine how she thinks about and interacts with them. 
We might say that someone who has such faith tends to believe in 
people, trust in them, make presumptions in their favor, or see 
them in a favorable light, morally speaking. 
How a person’s faith shapes her particular judgments varies con-
siderably, depending on the person and her circumstances. Never-
theless, part of having this virtue is having at least two characteris-
tic dispositions of belief. First, when someone who has such faith 
forms expectations about people’s future attitudes or actions, she 
tends to be relatively slow to judge them harshly. Such expecta-
tions are always uncertain, and when someone who has faith in 
humanity forms such expectations, she tends to judge, even in the 
face of reasons for doubt, that people will act decently, provided 
that they receive the right forms of encouragement. In some cases, 
as reasons to doubt people’s decency mount, her faith may simply 
dispose her to hold on to the belief that right action is attainable 
for these people, or in other words, a live possibility for them. But 
to be clear, she does not assume that people will behave well with 
ease or without assistance. To the contrary, she may judge in some 
cases that people can act rightly only if they, or the people around 
them, make considerable sacrifices.8   
Second, when someone who has such faith makes judgments 
about people’s past or current attitudes or actions, she tends to be 
acutely sensitive to evidence of people’s decency, including evi-
dence that others are likely to overlook. Of course, judgments 
about, say, people’s past or current behavior are often more cer-
tain than predictions about their future behavior. But assessing 
evidence for such judgments is still more complicated than it ini-
tially appears. Other people’s actions, motives, and especially their 
characters are almost always opaque to us, at least to some ex-
                                                          
8 One of King’s best known expressions of his faith in humanity is his 
claim that although “the arc of the moral universe is long … it bends to-
ward justice” (“Where Do We Go From Here?”, in A Testament of Hope, 
p.252). But he also warned that “human progress never rolls in on wheels 
of inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and persistent work 
of men willing to be co-workers with God” (“Letter from Birmingham 





tent.9 And when we evaluate another person’s past or current atti-
tudes or actions, we often have to interpret partial or ambiguous 
evidence concerning what she has done, how her actions fit into 
broader patterns of behavior, how and to what extent her actions 
serve her aims, or how these aims evolve over time. So even a rea-
sonably careful and clearheaded person could easily overlook evi-
dence of people’s decency. But someone who has faith in humanity 
is especially sensitive to such evidence. She tends to look for, rec-
ognize, and focus on the good in people, and as a result, she is 
somewhat more likely than her peers to judge that people are de-
cent, or that they have behaved well.10 
These two patterns of judgment are more closely related than they 
may initially appear. One cannot coherently judge that someone 
will behave well in the future – even if one believes that the per-
son’s good behavior depends on her getting assistance from other 
people, or on other favorable occurrences – unless one also be-
lieves that the person is now disposed to respond to her circum-
stances in the right ways. So a person’s sensitivity to evidence of 
others’ past and present decency may support her favorable expec-
tations about their future attitudes and behavior.   
But being disposed to exhibit these, or any other, patterns of 
judgment is not, by itself, sufficient for having the virtue of faith in 
humanity. Imagine someone who tends to be slow to judge people 
harshly, or quick to judge them favorably, simply because she does 
not bother figuring out whether their apparent goodwill is mis-
leading. And suppose it does not matter to her whether people 
turn out to be decent, except when her own wellbeing depends on 
their acting rightly. Such a person does not have faith in humanity. 
Rather, to have such faith, she must be invested in the possibility 
of people’s living morally decent lives, and in their realizing that 
                                                          
9 Stroud (“Epistemic Partiality”, pp. 506-507) emphasizes this point.                 
10 This marks an important difference between blind charity, as Driver 
describes it (“The Virtues of Ignorance”, pp. 381 and 382), and faith in 
humanity. The former trait, as its name suggests, is a sort of blindness, a 
failure to see people’s undesirable behaviors, motives, or traits. But faith 
in humanity is, in part, a kind of sight, an acute sensitivity to evidence of 





possibility. It has to be important to her, in itself, that these people 
act rightly, and this concern should lead her, at least in some cas-
es, to encourage people to behave well, to try to set a good example 
for them, to be disappointed when she encounters salient exam-
ples of serious wrongdoing, and so on. In short, as I said above, 
faith in humanity has not only a cognitive aspect, but also a voli-
tional aspect, and as I will argue below, both of these elements 
help make such faith morally admirable.   
This account of faith in humanity has two important caveats, the 
first of which concerns the epistemic rationality of such faith, and 
the second, the impact of such faith on one’s behavior. First, 
someone who has the virtue of faith in humanity is often disposed 
to make judgments that one could rationally reject – for that mat-
ter, being so disposed seems necessary for having faith of any sort. 
Furthermore, as I will explain below, a virtuous person’s faith can 
lead her to make judgments that are to some degree epistemically 
irrational, given the available evidence. But even so, having faith 
in humanity does not involve being blind to evidence of people’s 
poor character or behavior. Someone who has such faith may 
judge, say, that a colleague who regularly interrupts and ignores 
female colleagues is sexist and rude, or that a politician who often 
abandons unpopular views on pressing social issues lacks integri-
ty. More generally, someone who has such faith always stands 
ready to view people favorably, but she may judge, without any 
failure of virtue, that someone has acted or will act wrongly, that 
he has some grave vice, or that some aspect of his character cannot 
yet be redeemed, when she has decisive evidence to support this 
judgment.   
Furthermore, although a virtuous person’s faith in humanity 
sometimes disposes her to make irrational judgments, it does not 
always, or even typically, do so. Setting aside cases in which one 
has decisive evidence that someone is morally decent, or that she 
has acted, or will act, decently, there are at least two types of cases 
in which such faith disposes one to make rational judgments. In 
the first, the available evidence rationally permits one to view 
someone’s attitudes or behavior in either a more favorable or a 
less favorable light. Or it permits one either to make a judgment 





agnostic. In these cases, a person’s faith simply helps determine 
which of two or more permissible beliefs, or epistemic stances, she 
adopts. For example, one person may find her neighbor vexingly 
brusque and inconsiderate, while another person, who has had 
comparable experience with the neighbor, finds her refreshingly 
forthright, albeit ungraceful at times. It may be that each makes a 
clearheaded assessment of the limited evidence available to them, 
but their judgments diverge because their divergent tempera-
ments, backgrounds, or imaginative powers render different as-
pects of the neighbor’s behavior, or different interpretations of 
that behavior, more salient. In that case, each may be rationally 
permitted to make her judgment, though one judgment may be 
less imaginative or charitable than the other. 
In the second sort of case, one’s initial evidence does not, by itself, 
make rationally permissible the judgment that someone will act 
decently, but adopting this judgment plays an essential role in en-
abling one to treat the person in certain ways, and this is apt to 
result in her acting rightly. To take another, related example, a 
teacher’s belief that her student – who may have considerable na-
tive talent, despite his relatively weak academic record – can per-
form well in some challenging course may prompt her to spend 
time reviewing relevant material with him, to encourage him to 
take prerequisite courses, and so on. The student may perform 
well largely because of the teacher’s efforts, and because he has 
worked hard to meet her expectations. In William James’ words, 
this is a case in which “faith in a fact can help create the fact”.11 
The second caveat is that someone who has faith in humanity is 
vulnerable in certain respects to losses she will incur if people in 
whom she has faith turn out to be base, or if they have acted, or 
will act, wrongly. Again, it seems that having faith of any sort in-
volves risks, or in other words, involves being vulnerable to losses 
one will incur if one’s judgment turns out to be wrong.  When 
someone has faith in humanity, her vulnerability derives partly 
from her being invested in the possibility of people’s decency. She 
                                                          
11 William James, “The Will to Believe”, The Will to Believe and Other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Com-





cares whether people live morally decent lives, and as a result, she 
may suffer the pain of disappointment when people in whom she 
had faith, and whose behavior is salient to her, commit serious 
wrongs. And if she makes personal sacrifices in order to encourage 
people to act rightly, but these people act wrongly instead, the fact 
that her efforts fail can, by itself, make her life go worse, quite 
apart from any emotional pain it causes her.  
Beyond this, a person’s faith in humanity can sometimes lead her 
to trust people who go on to mistreat her, or mistreat others. So 
having such faith can increase one’s own risk of suffering material 
losses, and it can also leave others at risk of being mistreated.12 
Later on, after I discuss two exemplars of such faith, I can better 
explain how a virtuous person responds to such risks. But for now, 
I will make two preliminary points. First, faith in humanity is not 
the only excellence of character – nor is it the only moral virtue – 
that carries great risks. Someone who cares deeply about other 
people renders herself vulnerable to emotional and material losses 
she might incur if those people betray her, or suffer some great 
misfortune.13 A community of people whose sense of justice leads 
them to treat people accused of crimes as innocent until proven 
guilty may be less able to prevent violent crimes than a less just 
community that lays the burden of proof on the accused. And a 
benevolent person may, without any failure of virtue, try to help 
people in cases in which the results are inevitably uncertain – say, 
attempts at matchmaking or the provision of aid to poor commu-
                                                          
12 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments that helped me 
clarify this point.  
13 It may be that caring deeply about someone involves, not only pruden-
tial risk, but also moral danger. Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett 
(“Friendship and Moral Danger”, The Journal of Philosophy 97 [2000]: 
278-296) argue that, even in friendships we rightly admire, someone’s 
concern for her friend may lead her to exhibit moral failings. For exam-
ple, she may tell a lie to help her friend escape some difficulty, or she may 
come to find her friend’s minor moral vices exciting or alluring. Troy 
Jollimore (Love’s Vision [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011], 
pp. 146-161) argues that, even in morally admirable relationships, one’s 
love for someone can make one blind, in certain limited respects, to mor-





nities whose cultures and economies are very different from her 
own – and as a result, risk doing more harm than good in some 
particular cases.   
For that matter, the two attitudes that one might adopt as an al-
ternative to faith in humanity – namely, cynicism about people’s 
decency and the disposition to remain agnostic until one has deci-
sive evidence about people’s character – also involve certain kinds 
of risks. Of course, cynics and agnostics are less vulnerable to be-
trayal than their more trusting counterparts, and they may be bet-
ter able to defend themselves and others when people try to mis-
treat them. But as I will argue in Section IV, someone who adopts 
either of these attitudes risks committing a serious wrong herself: 
mistreating the people whose decency, or capacity for decency, she 
fails to recognize. And she risks missing opportunities both to pre-
vent people from acting poorly and to enter into meaningful rela-
tionships with them. 
The second point is that even though someone who has faith in 
humanity cannot eliminate these risks entirely, an otherwise vir-
tuous person who has such faith does try to reduce her own and 
other people’s risk of suffering material losses. As I will explain in 
Section III, she takes care to determine whether and to what ex-
tent possible expressions of faith – say, failing to guard against 
theft or injury, relying on someone to help carry out some aim, or 
trying to reform someone’s character – would leave her or other 
people vulnerable to loss. She acknowledges such risks openly, and 
she tries to avoid expressing her faith in certain ways when the as-
sociated risks are too great, or when the risks are moderate but the 
ends to be achieved are not sufficiently weighty. In short, someone 
who has such faith does not cultivate cynicism about people or 
dampen her interest in them in order to shield herself from the 
pain of recognizing that they are base, or that their actions are se-
riously wrong. But she does take significant steps to protect herself 
and others from physical and psychological harm, financial loss, 
and other bad results of people’s poor behavior.    
III 
To illustrate this account of faith in humanity, and to provide intu-





will discuss two moral exemplars who exhibit the trait. The first is 
Mohandas Gandhi. Though he exhibited such faith throughout his 
life, Gandhi’s faith was, in some respects, most striking during his 
early campaign to gain civil rights for Indian immigrants in South 
Africa.14 When Gandhi arrived in South Africa in his mid-twenties 
to practice law, he found that the Indians living there, many of 
whom had arrived to work as indentured laborers, endured sys-
tematic discrimination and almost constant harassment. White 
South Africans had passed laws that severely restricted Indians’ 
voting rights, property rights, freedom of movement, freedom of 
religious expression, and employment opportunities.15 And Indi-
ans who failed to treat whites with sufficient deference were har-
assed, or even beaten.16     
Gandhi responded by developing a style of nonviolent resistance to 
injustice that he would continue to refine throughout his life, and 
which he and others would use to gain civil rights for Indians in 
South Africa, and later to secure India’s independence from Brit-
ain.17 Practitioners of this form of nonviolent activism, called “Sat-
yagraha” or “soul force”, used picketing, strikes, boycotts, and civil 
disobedience to persuade white South Africans to treat them with 
appropriate respect. But their aim was not to coerce their oppo-
nents. Rather, they tried to eliminate injustice by converting the 
people who supported it. They faced the possible consequences of 
their protests – imprisonment, beatings, and even death – with 
love, rather than violence and hatred, and they believed that they 
would thereby lead South Africans to recognize, and eventually 
end, the injustices that they endured.     
                                                          
14 For a brief overview of Gandhi’s South African campaign, see Louis 
Fischer, Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World (New York: Pen-
guin Group, Inc., 1954), pp. 20-49.   
15 Ibid., pp 24-25. 
16 Ibid., p. 25. 
17 In Non-Violent Resistance, Gandhi describes in detail the aims, meth-
ods, and justification of Satyagraha, as well as the extensive preparation 





Gandhi’s commitment to nonviolence rested on a deep, two-fold 
faith. First, he had faith in the white South Africans who accepted 
or even supported discrimination against Indians. He believed, 
with relatively little experience on which to base his judgment, 
that if Indians were willing to endure the sacrifices needed to 
make their plight salient, they could lead white South Africans to 
acknowledge that the laws were unjust and to overturn those laws. 
In Gandhi’s words, a practitioner of Satyagraha must have “faith in 
the inherent goodness of human nature, which he expects to evoke 
by his truth and love expressed through suffering”.18 But Gandhi 
also had faith in the Indians who carried out his campaign. He be-
lieved, again without the aid of much experience, that these vul-
nerable members of a minority population could face insults, im-
prisonment, injury, and even the risk of death in order to convert 
people who mistreated them. And the success of the South African 
campaign resulted, in part, from the fact that Gandhi recognized 
the potential of his Indian followers and inspired them to live up 
to his expectations.   
Another exemplar of faith in humanity is the character of Alyosha 
Karamazov, the young hero of Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers 
Karamazov.19 The narrator states that Alyosha “lived all his life, it 
seemed, with complete faith in people, and yet no one ever consid-
ered him naïve”.20 He adds, in a somewhat overstated passage, 
that Alyosha believed that “no one … would ever want to offend 
him” and treated this view “as an axiom, given once and for all, 
without argument”.21 Early in the novel, Alyosha encounters “a 
small gang of schoolboys” who are throwing rocks at one of their 
classmates – a small, sickly, but defiant boy named Ilyusha – who 
is returning their fire.22 The boys explain that Ilyusha had stabbed 
one of their friends with a pocketknife, and when Alyosha ap-
                                                          
18 Mohandas Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance, p. 88. 
19 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Richard Pevear 
and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Random House, Inc., 1991). 
20 Ibid., p. 19. 
21 Ibid., p. 101. 





proaches the lone boy, both to protect him and to hear his side of 
the story, Ilyusha hurls rocks at him and bites his finger to the 
bone.   
Alyosha later learns that the conflict began when the boys mocked 
Ilyusha’s father, a poor man who had been cruelly beaten and hu-
miliated by Alyosha’s reckless older brother. Alyosha visits the 
boy’s family and gets to know them, and when he discovers that 
Ilyusha’s illness is getting worse, he comforts the boy by reconcil-
ing him to his classmates, casually bringing them together one at a 
time. Alyosha’s faith in the boys is expressed by his belief that, de-
spite their initial hostility, it is not only possible, but also worth-
while to reconcile them to Ilyusha. And this faith transforms them. 
With Alyosha’s prompting, the boys eventually develop a deep 
“friendship and concern” for Ilyusha, which brings the sick child 
“enormous relief”.23 And in the novel’s closing scene, at Ilyusha’s 
funeral, Alyosha urges the boys always to remember how their 
“good and kind feelings” for Ilyusha united them and, at least for a 
while, made them better people.24,25   
Thinking about Gandhi, Alyosha Karamazov, and other exemplars 
drawn from history and literature provides intuitive support for 
the view that having faith in humanity is a virtue.  These figures’ 
faith in people’s decency seems part of what makes them both in-
spiring and morally admirable. This faith is not just a neutral trait 
that they happen to share, much less a barrier to virtue that they 
somehow overcome. Imagine, contrary to what actually occurred, 
that when Gandhi arrived in South Africa, he judged that white 
South Africans were hopelessly unjust and that the Indian immi-
grants were not sufficiently disciplined to bring about reform 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 539. 
24 Ibid., p. 775. 
25 This episode illustrates Alyosha’s disposition to hold on to the expecta-
tion that people will act rightly, but there are also notable cases in which 
he demonstrates his acute sensitivity to evidence of people’s present de-
cency. See, for example, the section of the funeral scene in which he 
points out what is fine and worth emulating in each of the schoolboys 





through non-violent activism. And imagine that he managed to 
win civil rights for the Indian immigrants through a series of ag-
gressive and sometimes violent confrontations with South African 
authorities. We may find this imagined Gandhi courageous, re-
sourceful, and, perhaps, reasonable in his assessment of other 
people’s characters and abilities. But he seems to lack a morally 
admirable quality that the actual Gandhi, who acted partly out of 
faith in the possibility of people’s decency, exhibited.   
Furthermore, we can appeal to these exemplars to respond to the 
first source of skepticism about faith in humanity that I described 
above. Some may be wary of such faith because they believe that 
having it involves being naïve and, as a result, too vulnerable to 
being exploited, or too likely to bring it about that others are 
harmed. And some literary representations of traits related to faith 
in humanity may seem to strengthen this worry. Consider the 
character of Jane Bennet in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, 
who tends to see the good in people, but not the bad.26 Jane’s sis-
ter Elizabeth, the heroine of the novel, rightly admires Jane, but 
also seems surprised and sometimes irritated that someone with 
Jane’s “good sense” could be “so honestly blind to the follies and 
nonsense of others”.27  
Or consider the character of Dorothea Brooke, the endearing hero-
ine of George Eliot’s Middlemarch.28 Dorothea’s eagerness to find 
a worthwhile project to which she, a young woman in a Nineteenth 
Century provincial town, can contribute leads her to have a kind of 
faith in Mr. Casaubon’s talents, and in the good she might accom-
plish by marrying him, and by helping him complete his grand 
treatise on ancient mythologies. But shortly after her marriage to 
Casaubon, the lonely, unhappy Dorothea rightly suspects that Ca-
saubon’s research does not have anything like the significance that 
she had hastily attributed to it, and that, if anything, her marriage 
                                                          
26 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (1813). Driver (“The Virtues of Igno-
rance”, pp. 381 and 382) cites Jane Bennet as an exemplar of blind chari-
ty. 
27 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, Ch. 4, par. 9.  





has narrowed her prospects of benefitting people around her.29 
Such cases may suggest that although faith in humanity is an as-
pect of certain personality types that are agreeable on balance, it 
is, by itself, a form of naïvete that is a nuisance at best, and at 
worst, a danger to the person who has it and to people around her. 
But Gandhi’s life and Alyosha Karamazov’s story show that a vir-
tuous person can have deep faith in people’s decency without be-
ing naïve. And they show that although a person’s faith can lead 
her to act in ways that expose her or people around her to great 
risks, she need not exhibit any failure of virtue if she incurs these 
risks in the right way. As I said above, there are cases in which 
having faith in humanity makes one more likely to trust bad peo-
ple, and so, less likely to prevent them from mistreating oneself or 
others. In short, faith involves risks. But unlike someone who is 
simply naïve, someone who has faith in humanity tends, first of 
all, to be aware of the risks she takes. She takes care to identify 
ways in which possible expressions of faith – say, refraining from 
guarding against harm someone might cause, relying on someone, 
or trying to reform him – might leave her or other people vulnera-
ble to loss, and she acknowledges these risks to herself and to oth-
ers. For example, Gandhi had faith in the South African authori-
ties, but he also warned throughout his career that attempts to re-
form unjust governments might simply enrage them and provoke 
brutal responses.30 And although Alyosha has faith in the school-
boys, he is also acutely aware of the cruelty and depravity of which 
even ordinary people are capable.31 So he surely recognizes that 
when he takes the boys to visit Ilyusha, they might subject their 
classmate to further violence and insults.    
Someone who has faith in humanity can take such risks without 
exhibiting any failure of virtue, provided that – again, unlike 
                                                          
29 Ibid., Ch. 20. 
30 See, for example, Non-Violent Resistance, Sec. 2, in which Gandhi de-
scribes the evils that non-violent activists may have to endure.   
31 See, for example, Alyosha’s response to his brother Ivan’s accounts of 
animal torture, war crimes, and child abuse (Dostoevsky, The Brothers 





someone who is simply naïve – she takes these risks in a responsi-
ble way, limiting which risks she takes and how she takes them. 
She does not simply allow herself or others to become hapless vic-
tims of any wicked or negligent people who happen to be in the 
vicinity. Rather, she accepts her own and other people’s risks of 
being severely mistreated – whether on some particular occasion 
or in certain kinds of circumstances – only when it seems to her 
that there is something of sufficient moral importance at stake. 
For example, by leading protests and acts of civil disobedience in 
South Africa, Gandhi risked provoking the government to clamp 
down even more severely on the Indian immigrants living there. 
But he took this risk in the course of his careful, tireless efforts to 
gain civil rights for that same population of immigrants, and he 
garnered support among the people who might be affected, for 
better or worse, by his actions. Similarly, when Alyosha takes the 
schoolboys to visit Ilyusha, he exposes Ilyusha to the risk of having 
additional injuries and insults heaped upon him. But Alyosha 
brings the children together because this is his only hope of com-
forting the dying boy, whom he has grown to care about.   
When someone who has such faith does take on the risks associat-
ed, say, with relying on someone or trying to reform him, despite 
reasonable doubts about his reliability or capacity for reform, she 
does not take on these risks all at once or irrevocably, at least, not 
when she can help it. In other words, when she comes to believe 
that someone is morally decent in some respect, she does not 
simply charge ahead blindly in her dealings with him. Rather, in 
her ongoing interaction with him, she remains sensitive to new 
evidence concerning the quality of his character and the badness 
of the results that will occur if he turns out to be base. And if it be-
comes clear to her, say, that these results are too bad or the likeli-
hood of their occurrence too high, she may try to end her reliance 
on him, or abandon her attempt to reform him. Gandhi exhibited 
this kind of sensitivity to evidence and willingness to adapt 
throughout his campaigns for reform in South Africa and India. 





periments with truth”, to constant scrutiny, and he revised or re-
jected methods that proved unsuccessful.32 
This means that stories like those of Jane Bennet and Dorothea 
Brooke do not show that faith in humanity is merely a regrettable 
aspect of certain otherwise admirable character types. Rather, 
these stories remind us, first, that all forms of faith in people in-
volve risks. But, as I just argued, this is not a serious objection to 
the view that faith in humanity is a moral virtue – someone who 
has such faith avoids failures of virtue, not by avoiding risks en-
tirely, but by taking the right sorts of risks in the right ways. Sec-
ond, these stories remind us that people who have some measure 
of faith in others’ decency, including some people we rightly ad-
mire, can slip sometimes into naïvete or excessive idealism, say, 
because they lack experience or because they are in the grip of 
some strong desire or emotion. But, again, this is no objection to 
my claims. After all, benevolence is a virtue, but a benevolent per-
son who falls into the grip of sympathetic concern may be unable 
to give some needy person the harsh treatment he requires to rec-
ognize and improve his poor condition. Similarly, having a sense 
of justice is a virtue, but someone’s sincere desire for justice may 
be distorted temporarily into a desire for revenge when someone 
she loves is seriously injured or insulted. In short, someone who 
has faith in humanity can slip sometimes into related, but morally 
undesirable traits, and she may need vigilance and luck to avoid 
doing so. But this is true of most, if not all moral virtues, and so, 
cannot provide grounds for denying that faith in humanity is mor-
ally admirable.   
IV 
I have argued that thinking about certain moral exemplars, like 
Gandhi and Alyosha Karamazov, provides intuitive support for the 
view that having faith in humanity is a moral virtue. But some may 
not share my intuitions about these examples, and some of those 
who do may not trust these intuitions without some further ra-
tionale. Furthermore, even if we grant that having such faith is a 
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virtue, identifying a rationale for this view may help us better un-
derstand the role that such faith plays in moral life, and it may 
place the view on surer footing. So I will now describe three con-
siderations that provide such a rationale. While the first and sec-
ond considerations identify morally important results of having 
faith in humanity, the third is non-instrumental – it identifies a 
respect in which having such faith is morally admirable in itself, 
quite apart from the results. To be clear, I believe that showing 
that manifestations of a trait are apt to produce desirable results 
on balance – or at least, showing that they are not apt to produce 
very bad results – is essential for showing that the trait is a moral 
virtue. But in some cases, claims about the results of having the 
trait provide only part of the story. In particular, having faith in 
humanity is morally admirable, not only because it tends to pro-
duce good results, but also because it partly constitutes a certain 
morally important relation, namely, a kind of harmony or solidari-
ty, between the virtuous person and other members of the moral 
community.  
First, having faith in people’s decency tends to encourage them to 
act rightly. Roughly, when someone’s faith in humanity leads her 
to believe that people will act rightly, or to hold on to the possibil-
ity that they will do so, this is likely to result in her treating them 
in certain ways – ways in which she would not otherwise have 
treated them – and such treatment tends to prompt them to be-
have well. This is an instance of a broader social phenomenon that 
is both familiar from experience and widely discussed by social 
psychologists: one’s beliefs about people can prompt them, for bet-
ter or worse, to act in ways that confirm one’s expectations. The 
most obvious examples of this phenomenon are cases in which 
someone knows what another person expects of her and deliber-
ately conforms to that person’s expectations. One such case is that 
in which the student whose teacher believes that he can perform 
well in some challenging course works especially hard in order to 
please the teacher, or to avoid disappointing her, and his hard 
work results in his performing well.   
But there are also cases in which someone’s beliefs about people 
prompt them to act in ways that confirm her beliefs, without their 





especially important, though there may be others as well. (1) When 
someone’s friends, family members, or other members of her 
community view her in a certain way, whether favorable or unfa-
vorable, she may begin to view herself in that way – or in other 
words, to internalize their view of her – and act accordingly.33 (2) 
When people form expectations about someone’s behavior, they 
may send subtle behavioral cues, and she may respond directly to 
these cues by adopting the very behaviors they expect.34 (3) When 
people expect someone to behave in a certain way, this may de-
termine what opportunities they give her, or withhold from her, 
and her exposure to these opportunities, or lack of access to them, 
may result in her adopting the expected behaviors.35 (4) If some-
one realizes that people expect her to behave poorly, she may react 
in certain ways that shield her from the shame or disappointment 
of confirming their low expectations. For example, she may come 
                                                          
33 One study showed that simply telling elementary school students to 
refrain from littering had only modest, short-lived effects. By contrast, 
teachers’ labeling the students as “neat and tidy people” had greater and 
longer lasting effects. See R.L. Miller, P. Brickman, and D. Bolen, “At-
tribution versus persuasion as a means of modifying behavior”, Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 31 (1975): 430-441.  
34 In one classic study, C.O. Word, M.P. Zanna, and J. Cooper showed 
that if a white interviewer expects a black interviewee to perform poorly, 
the white interviewer will send negative, non-verbal cues – for example, 
she may sit relatively far away, make relatively little eye contact, and so 
on – and this may cause the interviewee to perform poorly (“The nonver-
bal mediation of self-fulfilling prophecies in interracial interaction”, 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 10 [1974]: 109-120). 
35 The following example comes from Robert Merton’s essay “The Self-
Fulfilling Prophecy”, in which he coined that now ubiquitous phrase: In 
the late 1940’s, some Northern whites supported policies that excluded 
blacks from their labor unions, on the grounds that black workers were 
more likely than whites to cross the picket line. But these union leaders 
failed to recognize that blacks who went to work for strike-bound em-
ployers often did so because they had been excluded from union jobs, 
and were therefore desperate for work. As more blacks gained admission 
to unions in the decades that followed, fewer crossed the picket line. See 





to care less about how she behaves,36 or she may create obstacles 
to behaving well so that she can blame her poor behavior on the 
obstacles, rather than her character or capacities.37 But her react-
ing in these ways is likely to result in her behaving poorly, just as 
people predict. One’s faith in people’s decency is apt to prompt 
them, in one or more of these ways, to act rightly, and it also tends 
to help one avoid subtly prompting them to act wrongly.   
The influence of a person’s faith in humanity on others’ behavior 
may be either large or small-scale, and both sorts of influence con-
tribute to the moral significance of such faith. In some important 
and striking, but relatively rare, cases, the faith of a few people 
prompts others to make large-scale social reforms, like extending 
voting rights to a disenfranchised population or providing access 
to education to members of an impoverished community. Gandhi’s 
life illustrates this sort of influence, as do the lives of many other 
social reformers. It may be that, generally speaking, one cannot 
produce large-scale social reform unless one has some measure of 
faith in leaders who have created or enforced bad laws, in citizens 
who have accepted such laws, or in disadvantaged people whose 
efforts are needed to carry out the campaign for reform. By con-
trast, in other, more common cases, someone’s faith in people’s 
decency does not lead to large-scale reform, but rather encourages 
some of the people around her to lead morally better lives. The 
story of Alyosha Karamazov illustrates this second, small-scale 
form of influence. And although the small-scale influence of faith 
in humanity may be less dramatic than its large-scale counterpart, 
it may have similar moral significance. I suspect that there are 
many cases in which a person’s motivation to act rightly in some 
                                                          
36 This is one of the mechanisms by which stereotype threat undermines 
the performance of highly qualified women and minority college stu-
dents. For an accessible overview of stereotype threat and some of the 
studies used to identify it, see Claude M. Steele, “Thin Ice: Stereotype 
Threat and Black College Students”, The Atlantic Monthly 284(2) (1999): 
44-47 and 50-54.  
37 See E.E. Jones and S. Berglas, “Control of attributions about the self 
through self-handicapping strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role 
of underachievement”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 4 





ordinary circumstance, despite some personal cost, may be subtly 
reinforced by the actions of a teacher, spouse, parent, or the like 
who believes in her and treats her accordingly. 
Of course, having faith in people’s decency does not always have 
these kinds of desirable effects. Our beliefs about people exert a 
broad range of influences on them, and although there are cases in 
which adopting a favorable view of people encourages them to be-
come morally better, there are also cases in which it results in their 
becoming worse instead. For example, a parent who believes too 
readily that her child is a good boy may end up indulging his vices 
well into adulthood. Furthermore, there may be cases in which 
adopting an unfavorable view of people prompts them to act right-
ly. To take a related example, a guidance counselor who expresses 
doubts about a student’s ability to succeed in a four-year college 
may spark the student’s indignation, motivating her to prove him 
wrong. So it may seem that, for all we know, having faith in people 
would have undesirable results on balance, or at least, less desira-
ble than the results of adopting a more pessimistic attitude.38  
There are, to be sure, particular cases in which having faith in 
someone would prompt her to behave poorly, or being pessimistic 
about her would prompt her to act rightly. But even so, when 
someone’s faith in people’s decency is tempered in the ways I de-
scribed above – namely, by her sensitivity to evidence about the 
consequences of her behavior and by her commitment to avoid 
taking certain kinds of risks – this reduces her likelihood of inad-
vertently prompting people to behave poorly. And we have good 
reason to believe that, in general, having this sort of nuanced faith 
in people’s decency has favorable effects on their attitudes and ac-
tions, effects that pessimism does not typically produce. Social 
psychological studies like the ones I cited above have identified a 
wide range of cases in which, despite the fact that our beliefs about 
people exert a variety of influences on them, adopting favorable 
evaluative beliefs about people prompts them, on balance, to be-
have in ways that confirm those evaluations. These include cases 
                                                          





in which people evaluate others’ personal habits,39 demeanor,40 
loyalty,41 and academic prowess.42 In the absence of reasons to de-
ny that charitable moral evaluations fit this widespread pattern, it 
seems reasonable to expect a sensitive, nuanced faith in people’s 
moral decency to have similarly favorable effects.  
By contrast, the negative impact of stereotyping on women and 
minorities provides a striking case study of the detrimental effects 
of sustained pessimism about people’s abilities. A wealth of studies 
shows that being a target of persistent and widely accepted nega-
tive stereotypes about one’s abilities generally makes it harder to 
perform tasks that require the exercise of those abilities, and 
                                                          
39 See Miller, Brickman, and Bolen, “Attribution versus persuasion as a 
means of modifying behavior”. 
40 In one well-known study by H.H. Kelly (“The warm-cold variable in 
first impressions of persons”, Journal of Personality 18 [1950]: 431-439), 
college students encountered a guest lecturer who had previously been 
described to them as having either a “warm” or a “cold” personality. Stu-
dents’ expectations about the lecturer’s demeanor helped determine how 
they behaved in class – for instance, students who expected the lecturer 
to be warm were more likely than their peers to participate in discussion 
– and the resulting interaction helped confirm their expectations.  
41 See Merton, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy”, pp. 196 and 197. 
42 One famous, but controversial study by R. Rosenthal and L. Jacobson 
(Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils’ Intellec-
tual Development [New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1968]) sug-
gests that when teachers expect their students to improve academically, 
this can alter their interactions with the students in ways that confirm 
their favorable expectations. In another, more recent study by M. Shih, 
T.L. Pittinsky, and N. Ambady (“Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Sali-
ence and Shifts in Quantitative Performance”, Psychological Science 10 
[1999]: 80-83), math tests were administered to Asian-American women, 
who are targets of positive stereotypes about their mathematical ability 
in virtue of their racial identity, and negative stereotypes in virtue of 
their gender. Subjects whose racial identity was made salient to them 
performed better, and subjects whose gender was made salient per-
formed worse, than members of a control group, to whom neither identi-





sometimes makes it harder to perform other tasks as well.43 So, to 
return to an earlier example, it may be that a guidance counselor’s 
pessimism about his student’s prospects can motivate her to suc-
ceed, given the right sort of background – say, if her friends or 
parents believe in her and challenge her to prove him wrong. But it 
seems unlikely that pessimism will have such favorable effects if 
everyone in the student’s life expresses doubts about her intellec-
tual ability. Similarly, while being a target of pessimism about 
one’s character on some isolated occasion might, in the right cir-
cumstances, spur one to act rightly, these studies support the view 
that being a target of persistent and widely shared pessimism 
tends to make it harder to behave or perform well. 
Furthermore – and this point is easy to overlook – although there 
may be cases in which pessimism about people has favorable ef-
fects on their attitudes or actions, faith tends to produce such ef-
fects in a morally preferable way. When one’s pessimism about 
someone else’s character prompts that person to act rightly, she is 
likely to be motivated at least partly by indignation or some other 
form of anger, and by a desire to prove one wrong. By contrast, 
when one’s faith in a person’s decency encourages her to act right-
ly, one comes to share an aim with her – namely, that she behave 
well – and one becomes invested in the achievement of that aim.44 
Given that concord is morally preferable to antagonism, it follows 
                                                          
43 For an accessible survey of such studies, see Claude M. Steele, Whis-
tling Vivaldi: And Other Clues to How Stereotypes Affect Us (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010). A study by M. Inzlicht and S.K. 
Kang (“Stereotype threat spillover: How coping with threats to social 
identity affects aggression, eating, decision making, and attention”, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99 [2010]: 467-481) shows 
that when people who are targets of negative stereotypes about their abil-
ities perform tasks that require the exercise of those abilities, they tend, 
not only to perform poorly on those tasks, but also to suffer other, linger-
ing ill effects, including heightened aggression, diminished self-control, 
and diminished ability to focus. 
44 The third consideration that helps explain why faith in humanity is 
morally admirable, which I will discuss later on, is importantly related to 





that the route by which faith leads people to act rightly is morally 
better than the route by which pessimism prompts them to do so.  
A second consideration that lends moral significance to faith in 
humanity is the fact that having such faith helps one avoid subject-
ing people to moral condemnation, or other sanctions, that they do 
not deserve, and thereby wronging them. In other words, having 
faith in people not only tends to produce the kinds of desirable re-
sults that I described, but also helps prevent one from bringing 
about certain bad results. Someone who has such faith tends to 
believe, despite reasons for doubt, that people are decent – or at 
least that decency is attainable for them, if only through the sup-
port and sacrifice of friends, teachers, or others who wish to help 
them act rightly. But as I said above, other people’s actions, mo-
tives, and characters are almost always opaque to us to some de-
gree, and as a result, our evaluations of other people are almost 
always uncertain. So unless someone refrains altogether from 
making judgments about people’s decency – a possibility I will 
consider below – she is bound to make mistakes. Either she will 
adopt a more pessimistic view and more or less always err on the 
side of condemning people too much, or she will have some meas-
ure of faith in people and at least sometimes err on the side of 
viewing them too favorably.   
Someone who tends to make only the first sort of error – that of 
subjecting people to undeserved condemnation – risks badly mis-
treating the people she wrongly condemns, and thereby wronging 
them. After all, people tend to care a great deal about securing 
others’ good opinion, not only because this is a means of getting 
other benefits, but also for its own sake. We might expect a person 
to be horrified if she discovers, say, that her neighbors or col-
leagues wrongly believe that she has committed some shocking 
crime or that she has some detestable vice, whether or not their 
false beliefs have other bad consequences for her.45 Arguably, if 
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nary constancy, is often, not only shocked, but most severely mortified by 
the serious, though false, imputation of a crime; especially when that im-
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an air of probability” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments [London: A Mil-





people care a great deal about securing others’ good opinion, one 
makes their lives go worse to some extent when one wrongly and 
severely condemns them, whether or not they ever learn about it. 
And if they do learn about it, say, because one reprimands them, 
treats them coldly, or tells others how one feels, this may cause 
them considerable distress. Furthermore, someone who wrongly 
condemns people may go on to wrong them – or in other words, 
violate their rights – in other ways, for example, by excluding 
them from her community, ruining their reputations, or even 
bringing it about that they are punished.       
By contrast, someone who has faith in humanity tends to judge 
that people will act rightly, even in some cases in which they will 
not, and that acting rightly is a live possibility for people, even in 
some cases in which it is not. In other words, she tends to make 
the second sort of error rather than the first, and as a result, she 
largely avoids mistreating people in the ways I just described.46 Of 
course, as I said above, having faith in people can have other kinds 
of bad results: one may waste time or effort in failed attempts to 
reform people, one may fail to prevent bad people from mistreat-
ing oneself or others, or one’s attempts to reform wicked people 
may simply enrage them, prompting them to respond aggressively. 
But even so, a person’s reasons to avoid the evils that might result 
from her pessimism trump her reasons to prevent the sorts of evils 
that might result from her faith.  
To be clear, my claim is not that the former evils are worse occur-
rences than the latter, but rather, that a person’s reasons to avoid 
the evils that might result from her own pessimism are of a differ-
ent and more pressing kind than her reasons to prevent the evils 
that might result from her faith. If someone is pessimistic about 
people who are in fact morally decent, then, as I just argued, she 
may seriously wrong them. By contrast, if she has faith in people 
who turn out to be base, she may fail to prevent these people from 
wronging others, but she does not wrong anyone herself, provided 
that she limits the expression of her faith in ways I described 
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above. Roughly, she avoids wronging people as long as she is sen-
sitive to evidence that some expression of faith would have bad 
results, she takes risks associated with an expression of faith only 
when there is something of sufficient moral importance at stake, 
and she takes such risks incrementally if possible.47 Most people 
judge – rightly, in my view – that a person’s reasons to refrain 
from wronging people herself trump her reasons to prevent other, 
comparable evils from occurring. So, on the plausible assumption 
that the expected results of faith are not far worse than the ex-
pected results of pessimism, it follows that a person’s reasons to 
avoid the wrongs she might commit if she is pessimistic about 
people trump her reasons to prevent whatever evils might occur if 
she has faith in them.  
Of course, having too pessimistic a view of people and having too 
favorable a view of them are not the only attitudes someone might 
adopt toward other people. Instead, she might remain agnostic, or 
in other words, refrain from making up her mind whether decency 
is attainable for people, except when she has decisive epistemic 
reasons to judge one way or the other. But adopting this sort of 
agnosticism does relatively little to prevent one from wronging 
                                                          
47 Some might claim that a person’s faith in humanity leads her to wrong 
people in at least one type of case that I discussed, namely, cases in which 
someone acts out of faith and, contrary to what she intends, her actions 
prompt some wicked person to do serious harm to others. For example, 
someone might start a campaign to secure civil rights for an oppressed 
group, but the campaign might fail, prompting the authorities to lash out 
violently against members of that group. I suspect that, even if she rec-
ognizes that her actions might produce such bad results, the person who 
acts out of faith in such a case does not violate anyone’s rights, provided 
that she takes the kinds of precautions that I described, and provided 
that her risky behavior is either necessary to help the people she endan-
gers or endorsed by these people. But even if we assume, for the sake of 
argument, that she violates the rights of people who get mistreated in 
such cases, the gravity of the violation is surely mitigated by the fact that 
other people conceive, adopt, and deliberately carry out the aim of mis-
treating innocents. Because the person who has faith acts with great care 
in uncertain circumstances and in pursuit of a worthy goal, she bears on-






people or mistreating them in other ways. Suppose that someone’s 
neighbors would cause her considerable distress if they expressed 
their mistaken belief that, because she was so thoroughly selfish, 
there was no point asking her for help or encouraging her to help 
others. In that case, they would probably cause her similar distress 
if they were agnostic about her and they revealed that they could 
not decide whether or not she was that selfish. Furthermore, when 
someone is agnostic about people who are, in fact, capable of act-
ing rightly, she may go on to mistreat them in some of the same 
ways in which one might mistreat them if one wrongly believed 
they were base, or worse, incapable of acting rightly. For example, 
she might unjustly exclude them from her community or ruin their 
reputations. In short, some of the same considerations that make 
pessimism about people objectionable make this sort of agnosti-
cism objectionable as well.   
A third consideration that makes faith in humanity morally admi-
rable is the fact that having faith in people’s decency, despite rea-
sons for doubt, is a way of standing by them, in roughly the sense 
in which one might stand by a decision, an ideal, or a friend to 
whom one is committed, despite reasons to abandon or denigrate 
her. The cognitive element of faith works together with the voli-
tional to account for this link between having faith and standing 
by. Someone who has such faith is not just disposed to view people 
in a favorable light, but also invested in their confirming her fa-
vorable expectations. She roots for people to lead morally decent 
lives, even in the face of reasons to doubt that they can, or will, do 
so. She thereby ties her own flourishing, in certain respects, to the 
quality of these people’s characters and actions. When people in 
whom she has faith behave well, despite some personal cost or 
other obstacle, she may feel satisfaction, and if she has expressed 
her faith in them, she may also receive their gratitude, or even the 
praise of peers who admire her perceptiveness. But when people in 
whom she has faith behave poorly, she may feel the pain of disap-
pointment, be ridiculed by peers who think she has been duped, or 
be mistreated by the very people in whom she once had faith. So 
there is an important sense in which someone who has faith in 





By contrast, adopting an attitude toward people that disposes one 
to deny that decency is attainable for them is a way of giving up on 
them, as when a parent resigns herself to the view that, at least for 
now, her child is hopelessly irresponsible, or when someone cyni-
cally dismisses her colleagues’ resolutions, say, to start volunteer-
ing or spend more time with their children. We might expect 
someone who discovers that many of the people in her community 
view her in this way, not only to feel the shame of being con-
demned, but also to experience a kind of loneliness, a sense that 
she has been abandoned.   
Standing by people in the sense I described is morally admirable 
given the following view, which is both plausible and familiar, 
about the role that morality plays in human life: conforming to 
moral ideals enables a person to live in a kind of community with 
others, even though their interests and aims may differ considera-
bly from her own.48 In other words, the world is teeming with peo-
ple, and their various interests and aims can come into sharp con-
flict. On the one hand, each of these people devotes special atten-
tion to her own private aims, and according to this view, it is ap-
propriate for her to do so. But on the other hand, there is a sense 
in which each person is just one among others, and no one is any 
more or less significant than anyone else. These two judgments are 
deeply plausible and central to the living of our lives, and con-
forming to moral requirements enables a person to live in a way 
that gives expression to each. Roughly, a virtuous person may pur-
sue her own private aims in some cases, but she limits her pursuit 
of these aims, adopts new aims, and adopts attitudes in ways that 
bring her into a kind of community, or harmony, with everyone 
else. Standing by people, as when one has faith in them; adopting 
others’ interests as one’s own, as when one has the virtue of be-
nevolence; and limiting one’s pursuit of one’s own aims so that 
others can pursue their aims as well, as when one has the virtue of 
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justice, are all ways in which a morally virtuous person escapes her 
solitude and enters into this form of community.49  
As I said above, this third consideration is importantly different 
from the other factors that account for the moral significance of 
faith in humanity. The first and second considerations concern the 
instrumental significance of such faith, which derives from the fact 
that having faith in people can play a vital role in prompting them 
to act rightly, and helping one avoid mistreating them. But this 
third consideration is non-instrumental, or at least, it has an im-
portant non-instrumental component. Of course, when someone 
acquires the kinds of attitudes and aims that bring her into com-
munity with others, this tends to have desirable results. For exam-
ple, it might enable her to cooperate with others, and thereby 
bring it about that everyone’s aims are better achieved, or it might 
help her develop fulfilling relationships with people. But her moral 
reason to enter into community with people, despite the fact that 
she has her own life to live, does not derive entirely from the de-
sirability of the results. Rather, it is also part of what she owes to 
them in light of the fact that their lives matter, that she is just one 
person among others whose lives are no less significant than her 
own. Standing by people, as when one has faith in them, consti-
tutes one way of entering into this sort of community with them, 
and therefore, a way of granting them the sort of treatment one 
owes to them.  
V 
                                                          
49 There is also another parallel between the virtue of faith in humanity 
and the virtue of justice. Someone who has faith in humanity adopts a 
stance toward each person she encounters or considers, and in virtue of 
this stance, she tends to believe, despite reasons for doubt, that people 
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Now I can return to the second, and more general, form of skepti-
cism about faith in humanity that I described in the introduc-
tion.50 Some might argue that being morally virtuous cannot be 
irrational, but having faith in humanity, or for that matter, faith of 
any sort, is irrational on epistemic grounds. So no matter what 
practical considerations commend faith in humanity, having such 
faith cannot be a moral virtue. I have already presented parts of 
my response to this worry, but it will be helpful to tie these threads 
together in one place. To begin with, as I said above, having faith 
in humanity does not typically dispose one to make irrational 
judgments. Setting aside cases in which a person has decisive rea-
son to view someone favorably, her faith may yield rational judg-
ments when she is rationally permitted to adopt either a more fa-
vorable or a less favorable view of someone, when she is permitted 
either to form a judgment about someone or to remain agnostic, or 
when her adopting a favorable view of someone is apt to prompt 
that person to react in ways that confirm her expectations. So con-
cerns about the irrationality of faith in humanity apply to a nar-
rower range of cases than they initially appear to.    
Nevertheless, there are some cases in which the kind of faith I 
commend can yield epistemically irrational judgments, where, 
roughly, a judgment is epistemically rational to the degree that it is 
supported by evidence of its truth. To take one possible example, 
Gandhi, as I said above, exhibited paradigmatic faith in humanity 
during his South African campaign. But it may be that his belief 
that the Indians in South Africa could endure the hardships in-
volved in carrying out a campaign of nonviolent resistance, or his 
belief that if they managed to endure such hardships, they could 
convert the South African authorities who oppressed them, was 
unjustified to some degree, given the evidence available to him. In 
any case, whether or not Gandhi’s beliefs were irrational, people 
often have to decide what to do despite being uncertain about how 
others will respond. In some of these cases, when there is little to 
be lost or something of sufficient moral importance to be gained, 
someone who has faith can, without any failure of virtue, form be-
liefs about people – especially beliefs about the decency of their 
future attitudes and actions – that are to some degree irrational, 
                                                          





given the evidence. This does not mean that having faith involves 
throwing rationality to the wind. After all, a virtuous person who 
has such faith remains sensitive to evidence of people’s poor char-
acter and behavior, and, crucially, she conforms to the require-
ments of practical rationality. But it does mean that, on the view I 
defend, there are cases in which a manifestation of someone’s 
moral virtue constitutes a failure of epistemic rationality.51  
However, this is not, by itself, a good reason to deny that having 
faith in humanity is a moral virtue. Of course, one has to meet 
some standard of epistemic rationality in order to count as being 
morally virtuous. For example, a person cannot be fully virtuous if 
she tends to ignore evidence concerning the consequences of her 
actions whenever she finds such evidence distressing. But even so, 
the ideal of a morally virtuous character is a practical ideal, con-
cerned with the sort of life one should live, and the moral im-
portance of epistemic rationality does not have absolute priority in 
determining the content of that ideal. Moral virtue comprises 
many traits, and just as a virtuous person’s benevolent impulses 
may be tempered, in some cases, by her sense of justice, so her 
disposition to respond to evidence in ways that are fully justified 
may be tempered sometimes by other morally important concerns.   
For example, provided that she meets some relevant standard of 
care in gathering evidence, a morally virtuous person may stop 
gathering evidence and form her beliefs, even if spending more 
time gathering evidence would make her somewhat more likely to 
arrive at the truth. She may stop gathering evidence because she 
ought to pursue some other morally important aim instead, or 
simply because she prefers to do something else. Or, to take an 
example that is closer to home, a virtuous person whose child has 
been accused of some terrible crime may cling to the possibility 
that her child is innocent, to a degree that is not fully justified by 
the evidence available to her. Of course, she will not be wholly 
blind to evidence of her child’s guilt, but if she loves her child, she 
will be invested in the possibility of his innocence, and far more 
concerned with providing support for him than with assessing the 
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available evidence impartially. So we might expect her to hold on 
to the possibility of his innocence, at least for a while, even after 
her reasonable, but disinterested peers have made up their minds 
that he is guilty.     
Perhaps, if we lived in a world in which our evidence was always 
clear, easy to attain, and sufficient to settle whatever questions we 
considered, we could always expect morally virtuous people to 
form judgments that were fully epistemically rational. After all, 
how one ought to behave depends, in part, on the facts, and in this 
counterfactual scenario, responding rationally to the available evi-
dence always leads one directly, and without difficulty, to the rele-
vant facts. But in our actual circumstances, evidence – especially 
evidence concerning the quality of other people’s actions, motives, 
and characters – is almost always ambiguous, hard to come by, or 
incomplete. And as a result, a virtuous person’s disposition to re-
spond in fully rational ways to whatever evidence happens to be 
available can come into conflict with her aims of encouraging peo-
ple to act rightly, treating them justly, and entering into an im-
portant form of community with them. So unless we assume that 
the moral importance of epistemic rationality is implausibly great, 
or the importance of these other aims implausibly slight, we 
should conclude that a virtuous person may sacrifice some degree 
of epistemic rationality, in certain respects and in certain cases, in 
her pursuit of these other aims.   
So, even on the assumption that having faith in humanity can lead 
one to make judgments that are to some degree epistemically irra-
tional, such faith is a centrally important part of moral life. If we 
hope to adopt a moral ideal that can accommodate both the uncer-
tainty of our moral judgments about people and the moral im-
portance of the aims we ought to pursue in the face of that uncer-
tainty, then we must count faith in humanity among the virtues.52 
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